1	Judah Lakin (CA #307740)	Emma Winger (MA #677608)*
2	Lakin & Wille, LLP 1939 Harrison Street, Suite 420	Katherine Melloy Goettel (IA #23821)* Leslie K. Dellon (DC #250316)*
3	Oakland, CA 94612	American Immigration Council
4	Telephone: (510) 379-9218 judah@lakinwille.com	1331 G Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20005
5		(617) 505-5375 (Winger)
	Zachary Manfredi (CA #320331) Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project (ASAP)	ewinger@immcouncil.org ldellon@immcouncil.org
6	228 Park Ave. S. #84810	kgoettel@immcouncil.org
7	New York, NY 10003-1502 (248) 840-0744	
8	zachary.manfredi@asylumadvocacy.org	
9	Counsel for Plaintiffs Tony N., et al.	
10	*Pro hac vice motions pending	
11	ANNUAL DE CALL ALLE CONTRACTOR DE	ACTION COT COLUMN
12	UNITED STATES D NORTHERN DISTRIC	T OF CALIFORNIA
	OAKLAND 1	DIVISION
13		
14	TONY N., KAREN M., JACK S., HEGHINE MURADYAN, DAYANA	
15	VERA DE APONTE, Individually and on Behalf of All Others	Case No. 4:21-cv-08742-KAW
16	Similarly Situated,	PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
17	Plaintiffs,	PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND
18	,	PROVISIONAL CLASS CERTIFICATION
19	V.	
20	U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION	Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore Hearing: December 16, 2021, 1:30 pm
	SERVICES; DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ALEJANDRO	6 , , , ,
21	MAYORKAS, Secretary of Homeland Security; UR JADDOU, Director of USCIS	
22		
23	Defendants.	
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NOTICE OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND PROVISIONAL CLASS CERTIFICATION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 16, 2021 at 1:30 pm or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard at the Oakland Federal Courthouse, 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, CA 94612, with the Honorable Kandis A. Westmore, Plaintiffs move the Court for a preliminary injunction compelling Defendants to adjudicate class member applications to renew their employment authorization within the 180-day automatic extension period at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) and to adjudicate renewal applications already pending beyond the 180-day automatic extension period within 14 days.

Plaintiffs also move the Court to provisionally certify a class and to grant a preliminary injunction as to the class. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify the following class:

All individuals:

- a. who filed applications to renew their employment authorization documents pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7(b); 274a.12(c)(8); and
- b. who received a 180-day automatic extension of their employment authorization pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d); and
- c. whose applications have a processing time of at least 180 days pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(10)(i).

This motion is based on the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, *infra*, the pleadings, records and files in this action, and such other evidence and argument as may be presented at the time of hearing.

A proposed order accompanies this filing.

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1	DATE: November 11, 2021	Respectfully submitted,
2		/s/ Zachary Manfredi Zachary Manfredi (CA #320331)
3 4		Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project (ASAP) 228 Park Ave. S. #84810
		New York, NY 10003-1502 Telephone: (248) 840-0744
5		Email: zachary.manfredi@asylumadvocacy.org
6 7		Emma Winger (MA #677608)* Katherine Melloy Goettel (IA #23821)*
8		Leslie K. Dellon (DC #250316)* American Immigration Council 1331 G Street NW, Suite 200
9		Washington, DC 20005 Telephone: (617) 505-5375 (Winger)
10		Email: ewinger@immcouncil.org ldellon@immcouncil.org
11		kgoettel@immcouncil.org
12		Judah Lakin (CA #307740) Lakin & Wille, LLP
13		1939 Harrison Street, Suite 420 Oakland, CA 94612
14		Telephone: (510) 379-9218 Email: judah@lakinwille.com
15		Counsel for Plaintiffs Tony N., et al.
16		*Pro hac vice motions pending
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PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND PROVISIONAL CLASS CERTIFICATION MEMORANDUM OF POINTS OF LAW AND AUTHORITY

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs and class members—people with pending asylum applications who Defendant U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has previously authorized to work—seek a preliminary injunction to compel Defendants USCIS and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to do what Defendants have long-represented they would do: adjudicate employment authorization document (EAD) renewal applications within the 180day automatic extension of employment authorization at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d). Abandoning their own rule of reason, Defendants are taking upwards of ten months to adjudicate EAD renewal applications for asylum seekers. Plaintiffs and proposed class members have lost jobs, employment benefits, and driver's licenses, and as a result are unable to support themselves and their families, suffer from anxiety, separation from communities of support, and a loss of essential stability. At a time when the United States is in desperate need of workers, Defendants are preventing Plaintiffs from doing that work. Because Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims that Defendants have unreasonably delayed in adjudicating their EAD renewal applications under the Mandamus Act or, in the alternative, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and because Plaintiffs have shown serious, irreparable harm from those delays, this Court should enter a preliminary injunction compelling Defendants to adjudicate Plaintiffs' renewal applications within the automatic extension period. Plaintiffs also ask the Court to certify a provisional class and to provide the class with preliminary injunctive relief.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Statement of Facts

Plaintiff Tony N. is an asylum seeker from East Africa and a truck driver who delivered personal protective equipment across the country during the pandemic. Ex. A, Decl. of Tony N., ¶¶ 1, 8-10. At the time his current work authorization expired, Mr. N. was on the verge of starting his own truck driving business. *Id.* ¶ 11. But because of Defendants' delay in processing his work authorization application he instead lost his driver's license and his current job. *Id.* ¶ 12. Living without any support network in the United States, Mr. N. has been forced to deplete his savings because he cannot work and he struggles with paying for necessities such as rent and health insurance. *Id.* ¶¶ 13-14.

Plaintiff Muradyan is an asylum seeker from Armenia and a medical doctor. Ex. B, Decl. of Dr. Heghine Muradyan, ¶¶ 1-2, 7. Doctor Muradyan has now lost her residency positions at two hospitals, as well as her health insurance, due to the delay in processing her work permit renewal, and, as a result, she can no longer provide care to her patients or support herself and her young son. *Id.* ¶¶ 7, 13-14. If Doctor Muradyan is unable to work for over three months, she will lose her Postgraduate Training License to practice medicine in different states and will need to redo an entire year of residency beginning in July 2022. *Id.* ¶¶ 11-12.

Plaintiff Karen M. is a pregnant asylum seeker from El Salvador with three other young children she supports. Ex. C, Decl. of Karen M., ¶¶ 1-2. Ms. M. works as a manager at McDonald's and has been informed by her employer that if her work permit is not renewed by November 15, 2021, she will be terminated from her position. *Id.* ¶¶ 4-5. Ms. M. has already been unable to renew her driver's license because of the delay in processing her work

permit application, and now, a month before she is scheduled to give birth, she fears that she will also lose her primary means to support herself and her family. *Id.* ¶¶ 6-8. Ms. M. will face significant economic hardship without her employment authorization, and will struggle to cover necessities such as rent, food, and clothing for herself and her young children. *Id.* ¶ 6.

Plaintiff Jack S. is an asylum seeker and an Apple, Inc. employee. Ex. D, Decl. of Jack S., ¶¶ 2, 7. Mr. S recently lost his position because of the delay in renewing his work permit and will soon lose his employer-based health insurance coverage. *Id.* ¶¶ 12, 17, 20. In addition, Mr. S has lost his driver's license as a result of Defendants' delay and can no longer drive to important medical appointments or easily acquire necessities such as groceries. *Id.* ¶¶ 15-16. Mr. S is suffering significant economic hardship without employment authorization and is struggling with how to pay his bills and cover his basic needs as he has nearly used up his savings. *Id.* ¶¶ 13, 14, 18.

Plaintiff Vera de Aponte is an asylum seeker from Venezuela and a Registered Behavior Technician for special needs children. Ex. E, Decl. of Dayana Vera de Aponte Decl. ¶¶ 2, 7. Ms. Vera de Aponte is the primary source of income for her family. *Id.* ¶ 9. She was recently terminated because her work authorization was not renewed. *Id.* ¶ 8. She is at risk of losing her Medicaid provider number, which Medicaid typically revokes after a period of inactivity, which could have serious long-term implications for her career. *Id.* ¶¶ 11-13.

Plaintiffs Tony N., Muradyan, Karen M., Jack S., and Vera de Aponte all experience significant mental anguish, emotional pain and severe anxiety as a result of the delays in processing their renewal applications. Tony N. Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Muradyan Decl. ¶¶ 9, 13-15;

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> Mot. for Prelim. Injunc. & Prov. Class Cert.

Karen M. Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, 9; Jack S. Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11, 13-14, 20; Vera de Aponte Decl. ¶¶ 9, 14, 17-18.

В. Statutory, Regulatory, and Administrative Background Relevant to **Asylum Applicants Renewing EADs**

Congress authorized the DHS Secretary (and previously the Attorney General) to provide work authorization to asylum applicants by regulation. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2). By regulation, eligible people with asylum applications pending before DHS or the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) may obtain employment authorization, as evidenced by a valid EAD. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, 274a.12(c)(8). An EAD for an asylum applicant is usually valid for two years. Compl. ¶ 27. An asylum applicant may apply to renew the EAD if their asylum application remains pending. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(b). Defendant USCIS provides an automatic 180-day extension of the asylum applicant's current work authorization, if the applicant meets certain criteria, including filing their renewal application before their EAD expires. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d). The automatic extension is a 180-day maximum; it ends if the renewal application is approved or denied earlier and it ends even if the renewal application remains pending on the expiration date. *Id*. The agency also advises employers that certain people may receive an automatic 180-day extension of their work authorization while USCIS adjudicates the renewal application. Compl. ¶ 33.

To renew an EAD, an asylum applicant files with the Dallas Lockbox a Form I-765 Application for Employment Authorization, required evidence, filing fee or fee waiver request, and a biometrics fee (unless an ASAP or CASA member) or fee waiver request. Compl. ¶ 40. The Form I-765 and instructions identify information collected from all EAD applicants and additional information and documentation asylum applicants must provide. See id. ¶ 38. The Dallas Lockbox accepts or rejects the EAD renewal application; if accepted,

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deposits any payments, issues a Notice of Action to acknowledge receipt of the application, and forwards the application to a USCIS Service Center for processing. *Id.* ¶ 40. The Notice of Action, commonly referred to as a "receipt notice," provides proof that the applicant is entitled to a 180-day extension of their work authorization, identifies the assigned Service Center, and has a receipt number that the applicant can use to track status. Id. ¶¶ 41-42.

C. **USCIS Delays in Adjudicating Renewal EADs for Asylum Applicants**

From Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 through July of FY 2021, the median processing time for all EAD applications ranged between 2.6 and 3.9 months. USCIS, Historical National Median Processing Times (in Months) for All USCIS Offices for Select Forms By Fiscal Year, USCIS, https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/historic-pt (last visited Nov. 10, 2021). But by the end of FY 2020, Defendant USCIS was taking longer than 180 days to adjudicate EAD renewals for many asylum applicants and processing times have continued to increase. Ex. G, Decl. of Swapna Reddy, ¶¶ 17-19 (reporting that of 1,253 respondents to an October 25, 2021 survey, 454 asylum seekers with pending EAD renewal applications had been waiting over six months for adjudication of their applications and 165 had been waiting over had been waiting over nine months); Ex. I, Decl. of Jenna Gilbert, ¶ 8; Ex. F, Decl. of Rachel Kafele, ¶ 24. In fact, Defendant USCIS reports that a "normal processing time" is ten months at the Potomac Service Center, and seven months at the Nebraska and Texas Service Centers. USCIS, Check Case Processing Times, https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/ (selecting "Form: I-765 Application for Employment Authorization" and "Field Office or Service" Center: Potomac Service Center" or "Field Office or Service Center: Nebraska Service Center" or "Field Office or Service Center: Texas Service Center" and scrolling down to "Form type: Based on a pending asylum application [(c)(8)]") (last visited Nov. 9, 2021).

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These delays are not happenstance. Defendants made a series of policy changes that unnecessarily slowed adjudications processes and led to adjudication delays across benefits. These delays included requiring interviews of all applicants for employment-based lawful permanent residents, overturning longstanding practice; substantially increasing requests for evidence for nonimmigrant petitions for H-1B specialty occupation workers; rescinding a 2004 policy memorandum that authorized adjudicators under certain circumstances to defer to a prior nonimmigrant visa petition approval when deciding an extension petition; implementing a "no blank space rejection policy" forcing thousands of applicants for humanitarian relief, including asylum, to resubmit their applications to USCIS; and implementing a biometrics requirement for Form I-539 applications to extend or change nonimmigrant status. Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass'n, Deconstructing the Invisible Wall: How Policy Changes by the Trump Administration are Slowing and Restricting Legal *Immigration* 7 (March 2018), 17-18, https://www.immigrationresearch.org/system/files/Deconstructing the Invisible Wall.pdf; Compl. ¶ 69-75. While Defendants eventually rescinded many of these policy changes, sometimes under the threat of litigation, Defendants have failed to resolve the resulting delays. See Compl. ¶¶ 69-75. In August 2021, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that Defendant USCIS had not implemented plans or identified resources and funding to reduce the backlogs or established timeliness performance measures for EAD application adjudications. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Actions Needed to Address Pending Caseload 24-27, 36-38 (Aug. 2021), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-529. Plaintiffs are paying the price.

III. ARGUMENT

A. Standard for Preliminary Injunction

To receive a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must satisfy four elements: (1) likely to succeed on the merits, (2) likely to suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief, (3) balance of equities tips in their favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The Ninth Circuit continues to recognize an alternative that includes a "sliding scale" for the first and third factors. A preliminary injunction is also warranted if plaintiffs demonstrate (1) "serious questions going to the merits," (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities "tips sharply" in plaintiffs' favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. *All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

In evaluating the preliminary injunction factors, courts also consider whether the preliminary relief requested is prohibitory or mandatory. *Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer*, 757 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2014) (*ADAC*). A prohibitory injunction precludes a party from acting "and preserves the status quo pending a determination of the action on the merits." *Id.* (quoting *Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co.*, 571 F.3d 873, 878–879 (9th Cir. 2009)). A mandatory injunction requires a party to act. *Id.* (citing *Marlyn Nutraceuticals*, 571 F.3d at 878–879). A mandatory injunction may be granted if "extreme or very serious damage will result." *Marlyn Nutraceuticals*, 571 F.3d at 879. As discussed below, Plaintiffs seek a prohibitory injunction, but even if this Court determines the relief is mandatory, Plaintiffs can meet the higher standard.

B. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on Their Claims under the APA and the Mandamus Act

Plaintiffs make two claims arising from Defendants' delay in adjudicating their EAD renewal applications. Under the Mandamus Act, courts have the power "to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Similarly, under the APA courts "shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Where, as here, Plaintiffs seek identical relief under both causes of action, courts analyze unreasonable delay claims under the APA standard. *Indep. Min. Co. v. Babbitt*, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997). Because Plaintiffs have established that Defendants have unreasonably delayed their duty to adjudicate EAD renewal applications for asylum applicants, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on both claims. *See id.*

1. Defendants Have a Duty to Timely Adjudicate Plaintiffs' Applications to Renew Their EADs

Defendants are required by regulation to accept, process, and adjudicate all EAD applications, including EAD applications by asylum applicants. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 ("USCIS has exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for employment authorization and employment authorization documentation based on a pending application for asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(8) . . ."), 274a.13 (requiring that applicants "shall be notified" of the decision to grant or deny an EAD application); *see also* 274a.12. By court order, Defendant USCIS has no discretion to deny EADs to otherwise eligible asylum applicants who are members of the Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project (ASAP) or CASA de Maryland. *CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Wolf*, 486 F. Supp. 3d 928, 974 (D. Md. 2020). In the circumstances where Defendants may deny an EAD to an otherwise eligible applicant in the exercise of discretion,

Defendants continue to have a duty to adjudicate those applications. *See Babbit*, 105 F.3d at 507 n.6 (stating an agency "cannot simply refuse to exercise [its] discretion"). Furthermore, "[e]ven where no time limits are imposed by the enabling-statute, Defendants have a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate immigration-related petitions 'within a reasonable period of time." *Doe v. Risch*, 398 F. Supp. 3d 647, 655 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 555(b)).

2. Defendants Have Unreasonably Delayed Adjudicating EAD Renewal Applications of Asylum Seekers by Failing to Adjudicate Within the 180-Day Automatic Extension Period

The crux of Plaintiffs' claims is unreasonable delay. As such, the Court's analysis turns on the six factors first laid out in *Telecommunications Research & Action v. FCC* (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984). They are:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a "rule of reason"; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the delay; and (6) the court need not "find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed."

Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2001). Because these factors weigh in Plaintiffs' favor, the Court should find that Plaintiffs are likely to show that Defendants have unreasonably delayed in the adjudication of their EAD renewal applications.

a. *TRAC* Factors One and Two: "Rule of Reason" and the Statutory, Regulatory Timetable

Defendants themselves have provided the content for the "rule of reason" through rulemaking. *See Rosario v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.*, 365 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1161-62 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (holding a regulation may supply content for the rule of reason);

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Garcia v. Johnson, No. 14-cv-01775-YGR, 2014 WL 6657591, at *8, 13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014) (finding plaintiffs stated a claim under the APA for unreasonable delay based on failure to comply with a regulatory deadline). While there is no regulation that sets a mandatory processing time from receipt to decision, Defendants' rulemaking makes clear that adjudication must be completed within the 180-day automatic extension at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d).

Defendants have repeatedly represented in their rulemaking that that they would and could adjudicate EAD renewal applications—and in particular, EAD renewal applications for asylum seekers—within the automatic extension period. Defendants issued the 180-day automatic extension rule in November 2016, at the same time they removed a 90-day processing deadline from receipt to decision, for the express purpose of "ensur[ing] continued employment authorization for many renewal applicants and prevent[ing] any work disruptions for both the applicants and their employers." Retention of EB-1, EB-2, and EB-3 Immigrant Workers and Program Improvements Affecting High-Skilled Nonimmigrant Workers, 81 Fed. Reg. 82398, 82456 (Nov. 18, 2016). Defendants then went further. In June 2020, Defendants removed as "unnecessary" a prior requirement that EAD applicants with pending asylum applications submit their renewal applications 90 days prior to the expiration of their EADs "[i]n order for employment authorization to be renewed before its expiration." 8 U.S.C. § 208.7 (d) (1997); Removal of 30-Day Processing Provision for Asylum-Applicant Related Form I-765 Employment Authorization Applications, 85 Fed. Reg. 37502, 37509 (June 22, 2020). Defendants provided this explanation for eliminating the requirement:

Because [the 180-day automatic extension at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d)(1)] effectively prevents gaps in work authorization for asylum applicants with expiring employment authorization and EADs, DHS finds it unnecessary to continue to require that pending asylum applicants file for renewal of their employment authorization 90 days before the EAD's scheduled expiration in order to prevent gaps in employment authorization.

Id. (emphasis added). In other words, Defendants through notice and comment rulemaking told the public, including asylum seekers and their attorneys, in June 2020 that they did not have to submit their renewal applications 90 days before expiration of their EADs in order to avoid gaps in employment authorization because Defendants would adjudicate their applications within the 180-day automatic extension period. Id.

A rule of reason that requires Defendants to adjudicate applications within the 180-day automatic extension period is consistent with, and supported by, the sense of Congress that "the processing of an immigration benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days after the initial filing of the application "8 U.S.C. § 1571(b); see Risch, 398 F. Supp. 3d at 657 (finding the sense of Congress "suffices to 'tip the second TRAC factor in [Plaintiffs'] favor'") (quoting Islam v. Heinauer, 32 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). It is also entirely reasonable that Defendant USCIS adjudicate EAD applications in 180 days for asylum seekers who it has already determined are authorized to work, when Congress intended that the underlying asylum application—the ultimate high stakes and complex application—be adjudicated in 180 days. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii).

Asylum applicants and their attorneys reasonably relied on Defendants' repeated representations that Defendant USCIS would adjudicate EAD renewal applications within the 180-day automatic extension period—consistent with its longstanding practice of adjudicating these applications in less than six months. Kafele Decl. ¶ 23: Reddy Decl. ¶ 27. Defendants cannot now abandon this rule of reason without notice or explanation. *See Encino*

Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016) (holding when an agency changes a policy it must provide "'a reasoned explanation" where that policy "'engendered serious reliance interests") (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515-16 (2009)); Nat'l Urb. League v. Ross, 489 F. Supp. 3d 939, 999 (N.D. Cal.), order clarified, 491 F. Supp. 3d 572 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ("[R]eliance interests should be considered even where the document giving rise to reliance expressly disclaims conferring any rights.").

Yet this is precisely what Defendants have done. According to Defendant USCIS' webpage, the "normal" processing time at all three Service Centers adjudicating EAD renewal applications for asylum seekers is well over 180 days. *Supra* Part II.C. Moreover, Defendants have not replaced their prior rule of reason with any rule at all. Defendant USCIS is not adjudicating applications on a first-in, first out basis. Ex. H, Decl. of Aidan Castillo, ¶ 8; Reddy Decl. ¶ 22. For all these reasons, the first and second *TRAC* factors weigh in Plaintiffs' favor.

b. TRAC Factors Three and Five: The Prejudice to Human Health and Welfare Due to Delay

There can be no dispute that Defendants' delay has resulted in significant harm to the welfare of Plaintiffs and proposed class members. *See infra* Part III.C. Defendants themselves have recognized the importance of maintaining employment authorization in order to avoid "work disruptions." 81 Fed. Reg. at 82456. Plaintiffs and class members have suffered or will imminently suffer job loss, loss of government-issued identification cards and driver's licenses, and employee benefits due to Defendants' failure to adjudicate EAD renewal applications within the 180-day automatic extension period. Ex. I, Decl. of Jenna Gilbert, ¶¶ 6-8; Ex. J, Decl. of Rachel Sheridan, ¶¶ 5-7; Castillo Decl. ¶¶ 13-14; *see infra*

Part III.C. The resulting instability and inability to support themselves and their families has additional consequences for asylum seekers who frequently have experienced significant trauma such that stability, support, and access to health insurance and other employee benefits are essential. Sheridan Decl. ¶¶ 5-7; Gilbert Decl. ¶ 8. Given these significant harms, TRAC factors three and five weigh heavily in Plaintiffs' favor. See Rosario, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 1162 (finding TRAC factors three and five "strongly weigh in favor" of plaintiffs when USCIS delays in adjudicating EADs for asylum seekers); Yea Ji Sea v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. CV-18-6267-MWF, 2018 WL 6177236, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2018) (finding factors three and five weighed in favor of plaintiff where, among other things, "Plaintiff is unable to work or obtain a driver's license, and therefore will be unable to support herself').

c. TRAC Factor 4: Higher or Competing Priorities

An EAD application is inherently a high priority for prompt adjudication. For noncitizens who do not automatically gain work authorization by virtue of their status, an EAD provides permission to work for the period of their temporary immigration status or the time it takes for Defendant USCIS to adjudicate the complex and high stakes underlying an application for immigration status. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c) (listing categories of noncitizens required to apply for authorization to work, with an additional nine categories "reserved"). An EAD application for an asylum applicant, and in particular an EAD *renewal* application, is neither high stakes nor particularly complex, but is an essential stopgap measure so people can support themselves while they pursue asylum protection. *See* Rules and Procedures for Adjudication of Applications for Asylum and Withholding of Deportation and for Employment Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 14779, 14780 (Mar. 30, 1994) (stating that

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150 days from the initial filing of an asylum application was the period "beyond which it would not be appropriate to deny work authorization to a person whose claim has not been adjudicated"). Mandating that Defendant USCIS abide by its own rule of reason and adjudicate EAD renewal for asylum applicants within the 180-day automatic extension period is entirely consistent with the priority that such applications take over applications that carry more significant immigration consequences. Defendant USCIS has acknowledged this as a priority, by promising applicants that the agency would adjudicate these applications within the 180-day automatic extension. *See* 85 Fed. Reg. at 37509.

Moreover, this is not a matter of cutting ahead in line. There is no line. Defendant USCIS is not adjudicating applications on a first in-first out methodology—or in any apparent order. *See* Castillo Decl. ¶ 8; Reddy Decl. ¶ 22. But more importantly, Plaintiffs seek to enforce the rule of reason as to *all* proposed class members who received a 180-day automatic extension of their work authorization. As such, the fourth *TRAC* factor also weighs in Plaintiffs' favor.

d. TRAC Factor 6: Impropriety

Defendants' delays in adjudicating EAD renewal applications for asylum seekers are unreasonable, even if the explanation for the delays is not unscrupulous.

C. Plaintiffs Will Be Irreparably Harmed Absent Preliminary Relief

1. Plaintiffs Seek a Prohibitory Injunction But Can Meet the Higher Mandatory Injunction Standard

The relief Plaintiffs request in this lawsuit is a prohibitory injunction. "[T]he 'status quo' refers to the legally relevant relationship *between the parties* before the controversy arose." *ADAC*, 757 F.3d at 1061 (emphasis in original, citing *McCormack v. Hiedeman*, 694 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2012)). The legally relevant relationship comes from the regulation

providing a 180-day automatic extension of the EADs—the time frame Defendants selected because the agency expected that this timeframe would be sufficient to avoid gaps in employment for most renewal applicants. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d); 81 Fed. Reg. at 82455-56. The status quo is Defendant USCIS adjudicating EAD renewals for asylum applicants within the 180-day automatic extension. *See, e.g.*, Castillo Decl. ¶ 10; Rachel Kafele Decl. ¶ 16; Jack S. Decl. ¶ 4. The status quo for individual asylum seekers is retention of their authorization to work. The preliminary relief is prohibitory because USCIS would be enjoined from deviating from the status quo by taking longer than 180 days to adjudicate EAD renewals. *See ADAC*, 757 F.3d at 1061. Even if the Court finds that this is a mandatory injunction, Plaintiffs have and will continue to suffer extreme or very serious damage absent a preliminary injunction due to job loss and an inability to pursue a chosen career path, loss of employer-based benefits, loss of drivers' licenses, and emotional distress. ¹

2. Loss of Employment Authorization Prevents Plaintiffs From Supporting Themselves and Their Families Financially

Cut off from their only source of income, Plaintiffs and their families face economic hardship, and possible homelessness, due to their loss of work authorization. Muradyan Decl. ¶ 13; Jack S. Decl. ¶ 14; Vera De Aponte Decl. ¶ 9; *see also* Karen M. Decl. ¶¶ 6-7; Tony N. Decl. ¶¶ 13-14. Plaintiffs are or will be suddenly unable to pay basic expenses such as their mortgages, food, medical care, and rent. Muradyan ¶ 13; Jack S. Decl. ¶ 14; Karen M. Decl. ¶ 6; Tony N. Decl. ¶¶ 13-14. This is particularly devastating for Plaintiffs who are a primary

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction where harms are either current or immediately threatened. *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (requiring there be a "real and immediate threat" of harm to qualify for an injunction). Even where their work authorization has not yet lapsed, given USCIS' extreme delays in processing thousands of renewal applications, Plaintiffs are almost certain to suffer the harms described above. Thus, Plaintiffs can easily show that they are suffering, or are immediately threatened with, extreme and very serious harm.

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source of income for their families. *See* Vera De Aponte Decl. ¶ 9; Muradyan Decl. ¶ 13; Karen M. Decl. ¶ 6. These harms are typical of class members as well. Reddy Decl. ¶¶ 28-30; Kafele Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; Gilbert Decl. ¶ 6.

This loss of income is a monetary harm for which Plaintiffs have no means of future recovery. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (waiving sovereign immunity for "relief other than money damages"). The Ninth Circuit has found that where Plaintiff has no way of recovering monetary damages, economic harm is irreparable. See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 993 F.3d 640, 677 (9th Cir. 2021) ("[W]here parties cannot typically recover monetary damages flowing from their injury—as is often the case in APA cases—economic harm can be considered irreparable."); California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 581 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[S]uch harm is irreparable here because the states will not be able to recover monetary damages connected to the IFRs."); Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 561 U.S. 1301, 1304 (2010) ("If expenditures cannot be recouped, the resulting loss may be irreparable."). Plaintiffs have lost not only months of income, but they also have been forced to deplete their savings as they have struggled to survive without work. Tony N. Decl. ¶ 13; Jack S. Decl. ¶ 14. They stand to remain unemployed for an indeterminate amount of time absent an injunction. They have no legal recourse for recovering these lost wages now or in the future and are thus entitled to an injunction to prevent extreme and very serious harm.

3. Without Employment Authorization Plaintiffs Stand to Lose Health Insurance and Disability Benefits

When Plaintiffs lose their jobs because of a lapse in work authorization, they also lose their employer-based health insurance coverage and disability benefits for themselves and their families. Jack S. Decl. ¶ 13, 17; Muradyan Decl. ¶ 14; Vera De Aponte Decl. ¶ 14. Without valid work authorization, many Plaintiffs also cannot apply for alternative health

insurance through the government. See HealthCare.gov, Immigration Status and the Marketplace, https://www.healthcare.gov/immigrants/immigration-status/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2021) ("Applicants for asylum are eligible for Marketplace coverage only if they've been granted employment authorization or are under the age of 14 and have had an application pending for at least 180 days."); Covered California, Proof of Immigration Status or Lawful Presence, Covered California, https://www.coveredca.com/documents-to-confirm-eligibility/immigration-status/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2021). See also Vera De Aponte Decl. ¶ 14; Kafele Decl. ¶ 10; Gilbert Decl. ¶ 7. A need for health care, and the consequences of its loss, is not speculative harm for Plaintiffs. For example, Plaintiff Jack S. is worried about disruptions to his HIV treatment once he loses his employer-based insurance. Jack S. Decl. ¶ 18. Plaintiff Muradyan is unable to access mental health services to treat her depression because she has lost her employer-based health insurance. Muradyan Decl. ¶ 14.

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the deprivation of benefits, such as disability benefits, amounts to irreparable harm. *See, e.g., Lopez v. Heckler*, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1983); *Leschniok v. Heckler*, 713 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1983) ("We fail to comprehend the Secretary's argument that financial compensation at some future date, should the claimants survive and prevail, mitigates the hardship which is visited upon claimants and their families each and every day" due to loss of disability benefits). In *Lopez v. Heckler*, the Ninth Circuit noted that "[d]eprivation of benefits pending trial might cause economic hardship, suffering or even death. Retroactive restoration of benefits would be inadequate to remedy these hardships." 713 F.2d at 1437. The very serious harm suffered from a loss of access to health insurance is only heightened during a pandemic, and alone shows that Plaintiffs have satisfied the harm standard necessary for a preliminary injunction.

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4. Defendants' Delays Prevent Plaintiffs From Advancing in Their Careers

In addition to irreparable harm due to loss of current employment, Defendants' delays also prevent Plaintiffs from advancing in their careers. Stripped of their work authorization through no fault of their own, Plaintiffs and class members have had to forego long-term employment contracts, promotions, and the option to pursue their chosen profession. See Vera De Aponte Decl. ¶¶ 11-13; Muradyan Decl. ¶¶ 11-12; Tony N. Decl. ¶¶ 11-13. For example, Plaintiff Dayana Vera de Aponte's lapse in work authorization could force her to lose her license as a Registered Behavior Technician. Vera De Aponte Decl. ¶¶ 7, 11. Granting of work permit later will not restore Plaintiff Vera de Aponte's license and will therefore have long-term career consequences, because she will be required to reapply, a process that can take many months, and new applications are not being accepted currently. Id. ¶¶ 11-13. Plaintiff Heghine Muradyan will also lose her Postgraduate Training License and Drug Enforcement Administration licenses, which allow her to practice medicine and prescribe medication in different states. Muradyan Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff Tony N. worked as a truck driver, an essential job during the pandemic. He had been saving his money to start his own trucking business and had even registered his business before his work authorization expired. Tony N. Decl. ¶¶ 11-13. Unable to work or even drive, he has been forced to set aside his dream of owning his own business and use up his savings in order to survive. *Id.*

The Ninth Circuit has recognized harms to people's career opportunities as irreparable even in less severe cases. *See ADAC*, 757 F.3d at 1068 (finding irreparable harm to plaintiffs because the inability to acquire a driver's license and drive legally limited their professional and career opportunities in the state of Arizona, where 87 percent of the

workforce drives to work); see also Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197,

1205 (2d Cir. 1970) ("[T]he right to continue a business . . . is not measurable entirely in monetary terms, the [Plaintiffs] Semmes want to sell automobiles, not to live on the income from a damages award."). Here, Plaintiffs have not only been deprived of their means to commute to work, but the ability to obtain any employment at all. Like the Plaintiffs in *ACDC*, many are in formative stages of their careers. *See* Muradyan Decl. ¶¶ 11-12; Vera de Aponte Decl. ¶11; *see also* Reddy Decl. ¶33; Ex. L, Decl. of Maria Odom, ¶9 ("Children turning 18, particularly those who are forced out of foster care at that time, require employment authorization to be able to support themselves, or to acquire work or internship experience as an essential step toward becoming self-supporting.").

5. Defendants' Delay Denies Plaintiffs' Access to Driver's Licenses and Government-Issued Identification Necessary to Pursue Work and Care for Themselves and Their Families

Due to the expiration of their work authorization, Plaintiffs are not able to renew their drivers' licenses and have lost the ability to drive. Tony N. Decl. ¶ 12; Karen M. Decl. ¶ 8; Jack S. Decl. ¶ 15; see also, Sheridan Decl. ¶ 8; Gilbert Decl. ¶ 7. This has caused severe hardship for Plaintiffs. For example, Plaintiff Tony N. relied on his driver's license to work as a truck driver. The company he worked for has been unable to assign him to any jobs since September because of his expired license. Tony N. Decl. ¶ 12. For Plaintiff Karen M. it has become very difficult to complete daily tasks, such as dropping her children off at school and attending doctor's appointments as an expecting mother. Karen M. Decl. ¶ 9-10. Plaintiff Jack S. has also faced significant hardship by being unable to drive to medical appointments and to secure necessities such as groceries. Jack S. Decl. ¶ 16. Moreover, as displaced asylum seekers many Plaintiffs here do not have family and networks who they can rely on for

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transportation and support. See Tony N. Decl. ¶ 14; Karen M. Decl. ¶ 6, 10; see also, Kafele Decl. ¶ 13. Thus, the harm here extends beyond the inability to commute to work and has had even more severe consequences than the harm in ADAC. See 757 F.3d at 1068.

Moreover, without a valid EAD card, many Plaintiffs and class members have also lost their only form of government identification. Karen M. Decl. ¶ 12; see also, Odom Decl. ¶ 9 ("In many states, an EAD or social security number is required to obtain state identification documents, a driver's license, a bank account, or funding for higher education—all critical steps toward establishing a young person's future independence and stability."); Gilbert Decl. ¶ 7 ("Often, without work authorization asylum seekers cannot apply for state-issued identification cards or driver's licenses, further limiting their access to transportation, banking, or other private support services."); Sheridan Decl. ¶ 5 (noting that "[s]etbacks in meeting their basic life needs such as . . . valid identification have serious consequences"). This is especially difficult for asylum seekers like Plaintiff Karen M. and her children, who are unable to acquire passports as alternative identification because doing so would require their father's consent and could endanger them. Karen M. Decl. ¶ 12.

> 6. Long Delays in Processing Plaintiffs' EAD Renewal Applications Causes Severe Emotional Distress that is Especially Damaging to Asylum Seekers who have Suffered Severe Trauma

Defendants' delays have also caused Plaintiffs emotional distress and psychological injury. Tony N. Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Jack S. Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11, 13, 20; Vera de Aponte Decl. ¶¶ 9, 14, 17-18; Muradyan Decl. ¶¶ 9, 13-15; Karen M. Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, 9. For Plaintiffs, losing their work authorization has resulted in anxiety, loss of sleep, and depression. Muradyan Decl. ¶¶ 9, 14; Jack S. Decl. ¶ 20; Tony N. Decl. ¶ 14-15; Vera de Aponte Decl. ¶ 9, 14, 18; see also Kafele Decl. ¶ 15 (noting that asylum seekers suffer from severe depression and even suicidal ideation as a result of loss of work authorization). The Ninth Circuit in Chalk v. US

District Court Cent. Dist. found that emotional and psychological injury constituted irreparable harm, when a teacher was denied the opportunity to pursue a particular teaching position based on his AIDS diagnosis. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist., 840 F.2d 701, 709-10 (9th Cir. 1988). Even though the plaintiff in Chalk was offered alternative employment, that job involved different, and less preferable, job duties, and "d[id] not utilize his skills, training or experience." Id. at 709. The court of appeals found that the alleged discrimination deprived the teacher of work that brought him "tremendous personal satisfaction and joy" and the resulting "emotional and psychological" injury was irreparable. Id. at 709-10. Here, Plaintiffs and class members suffer from significant emotional distress and do not have alternative employment options currently available to them because they are not authorized to work at all. Thus, Plaintiffs' harm rises to the level of extreme and very serious damage necessary for an injunction.

Moreover, the loss of stability that comes with unemployment is especially harmful for asylum seekers, who have escaped from traumatic situations and are often recovering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) while working to get their lives in order. *See* Sheridan Decl. ¶¶ 5-7. Losing their income and the ability to support themselves and their families causes extreme emotional distress and can be immensely triggering. Jack S. Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11, 13-14, 20; Tony N. Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Vera de Aponte Decl. ¶ 9, 14, 17-18; *see also*, Sheridan Decl. ¶ 6. Moreover, losing work authorization can also lead to an interruption in mental health care, which can exacerbate the risk of homelessness for asylum seekers. *See* Kafele Decl. ¶ 15.

For all these reasons—loss of income that cannot be recovered, loss of essential employment-based benefits including health insurance and disability benefit, loss of the

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ability to pursue one's chosen career, loss of driver's licenses and government-issued identification, and emotional distress—Plaintiffs have established that they will suffer severe harm if a preliminary injunction is not entered.

D. The Balance of Equities and the Public Interest Favor Plaintiffs

When the government is a party, the balance of equities and public interest factors are merged. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 993 F.3d at 668 (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). Plaintiffs and proposed class members, the government, and the public all have an interest in asylum applicants who qualify for renewal of their EADs having their applications adjudicated before the 180-day extension period expires. Loss of work authorization due to Defendants' adjudications delays harms the public interest because the U.S. economy is severely impacted by a shortage of workers. Without work authorization, Plaintiffs and proposed class members can no longer legally be part of the workforce. The need for such workers is great. The U.S. Department of Labor reported that in August 2021 there were 10.4 million job openings, while the number of people leaving employment rose to 4.3 million, the highest monthly level reported since December 2000. Compl. ¶ 3 "The U.S. labor force participation rate has only recovered about half of what it lost at the onset of the pandemic," attributable to reasons such as early retirement, no childcare, and relocation. K. Marino, Immigrants could help fill America's millions of job openings, Axios (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.axios.com/immigration-jobs-employment-pandemic-labor-shortage-2c5af6a4-4c90-451c-9b8a-124ee55ceb7b.html.

As leading economic experts have long recognized, authorizing immigrants, like the named plaintiffs and proposed class members, to work can play a crucial role in mitigating labor shortages. *See, e.g.*, N. Narea, *Immigrants Could Fix the US Labor Shortage*, Vox (Oct.

26, 2021), https://www.vox.com/business-and-finance/2021/10/26/22733082/labor-shortage-inflation-immigration-foreign-workers (quoting such experts on the importance of immigrant workers in addressing the shortage). Plaintiffs work in essential industries where demand for workers is especially great. *See* Jennifer Smith, *Where Are All the Truck Drivers? Shortage Adds to Delivery Delays*, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/truck-driver-shortage-supply-chain-issues-logistics-11635950481; Gaby Galvin, *Nearly 1 in 5 Health Care Workers Have Quit Their Jobs During the Pandemic*, Morning Consult (Oct. 4, 2021), https://morningconsult.com/2021/10/04/health-care-workers-series-part-2-workforce/.

The equities and public interest also tip in favor of Plaintiffs and proposed class members because of the particular vulnerability of asylum seekers. *See supra*, Part III.C.

E. Provisional Class Certification is Warranted

Plaintiffs also move the Court to provisionally certify a class and to grant a preliminary injunction as to the class. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); *Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs.*, *LLC*, 707 F.3d 1036, 1041-43 (9th Cir. 2012) (allowing for provisional class certificate for the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief). As discussed fully in Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and accompanying memorandum of points and authority, ECF No. 16, Plaintiffs meet the requirements for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Plaintiffs seek class certification because joinder would be impracticable in this case; Plaintiffs estimate that hundreds, if not more than 1,000, geographically dispersed asylum seekers are affected by Defendant USCIS' delays. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). See

Reddy Decl. ¶ 18. Common questions of law and fact predominate any questions affecting
the individually named Plaintiffs, including whether there is a duty to adjudicate the EAD
renewal applications of asylum applicants within the 180-day automatic extension at 8
C.F.R. § 274a.13(d), and whether Defendants' delays are unreasonable. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(a), 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the entire class as they
are all asylum applicants whose applications to renew their EADs have been pending with
Defendant USCIS for at least 180 days pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(10)(i) and they
received the 180-day automatic extension. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiffs will fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the proposed class as they seek relief on behalf of the
class as a whole and they have no interest antagonistic to the class members. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(4). Plaintiffs are represented by competent counsel with extensive experience in both
complex class actions and immigration law and can fairly, competently, and ethically
represent the interests of the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); Mot. Class Cert. Decls. I, J.

Finally, class-wide relief under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate. Plaintiffs challenge—and seek declaratory and injunctive relief from—systemic policies and practices that consistently prevent the timely adjudication of EAD renewal applications for asylum seekers.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify the following class:

All individuals:

- a. who filed applications to renew their employment authorization documents pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7(b); 274a.12(c)(8); and
- b. who received a 180-day automatic extension of their employment authorization pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d); and
- c. whose applications have a processing time of at least 180 days pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(10)(i).

1 IV. **CONCLUSION** 2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court certify a provisional class 3 and enter a preliminary injunction compelling Defendants to adjudicate Plaintiffs' and class 4 members' renewal applications within the 180-day automatic extension period at 8 C.F.R. 5 § 274a.13(d) and to adjudicate renewal applications already pending beyond the 180-day 6 automatic extension period within 14 days. 7 8 9 DATE: November 11, 2021 Respectfully submitted, 10 /s/ Zachary Manfredi Zachary Manfredi (CA #320331) 11 Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project (ASAP) 228 Park Ave. S. #84810 12 New York, NY 10003-1502 Telephone: (248) 840-0744 13 Email: zachary.manfredi@asylumadvocacy.org 14 Emma Winger (MA #677608)* Katherine Melloy Goettel (IA #23821)* 15 Leslie K. Dellon (DC #250316)* American Immigration Council 16 1331 G Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20005 17 Telephone: (617) 505-5375 (Winger) Email: ewinger@immcouncil.org 18 Idellon@immcouncil.org kgoettel@immcouncil.org 19 Judah Lakin (CA #307740) 20 Lakin & Wille, LLP 1939 Harrison Street, Suite 420 21 Oakland, CA 94612 Telephone: (510) 379-9218 22 Email: judah@lakinwille.com 23 Counsel for Plaintiffs Tony N., et al. *Pro hac vice motions pending 24 25 26 27

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